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INCE the days before a group of revolutionaries declared this an
independent country, no longer to be ruled by a monarchy from
across the sea, how to finance campaigns for election to public of-
fice has been a thorn in the side of democracy.
In 1757, for example, George Washington was charged with a kind of
campaign spending irregularity in his race for a seat in the Virginia
House of Burgesses. With only 391 voters in his district, Washington
is said to have purchased and distributed during his campaign more
than a quart and a half of rum, wine, beer, and hard cider per
person.1
How to finance campaigns, how to regulate campaigns, and how to moni-
tor campaigns pose fundamental constitutional questions. These ques-
tions arise from Articles I and II of the Constitution, the First
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. The problem is that none of the above provisions of the Constitu-
tion address directly how campaigns for election to federal office are to
be financed. For many years, the United States had no campaign finance
law, not many people could contribute or even vote, and campaigns did
not cost much at all. In the present time, however, campaigns cost an
almost-inconceivable sum, and the possibility of buying influence with
elected officials is therefore great. So the remainder of this article will
examine the new campaign finance legislation, its constitutionality under
the "traditional" First Amendment approach, its constitutionality under a
political equality and democracy rationale, and the possibility of public
financing of federal elections. Section II will examine the origin of cam-
paign finance laws, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the 1974
* B.A., cum laude, 1998, Southern Methodist University; Candidate for J.D., 2003,
Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author wishes to thank her
parents, Mitchell and Beth Wassom, for their loving support, Common Cause for its inspi-
ration, and Professor Darren Hutchinson for his suggestions and enthusiasm.
1. Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics, at http://
www.opensecrets.org/pubs/history/historyindex.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
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amendments, Buckley v. Valeo and the 1976 amendments, and subse-
quent legislation. Section III will, in turn, examine subsequent litigation
arising after the decision in Buckley v. Valeo and how the standard has
changed. The legislation before the 107th Congress, S. 27 as passed (the
McCain-Feingold bill) and H.R. 2356 as passed (the Shays-Meehan bill),
will be examined in Section IV. Section V will then assert a political
equality and democracy rationale for campaign finance reform legislation
and provide reasons for overturning Buckley v. Valeo. Finally, in a look
to the future, Section VI will examine the ultimate goal, public financing
of federal elections.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
A. ORIGINS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
1. The Time Before Watergate
Prior to the Watergate scandal, many efforts were made to regulate the
financing of federal campaigns. All these efforts were small measures, at
best, and none were effective; however, they provided the impetus for
change and the idea that democracy demands regulation of campaign fi-
nance. The first such measure came in 1867 with passage of the Naval
Appropriations Bill that "prohibited officers and employees of the gov-
ernment from soliciting money from naval yardworkers. ' '2 Then in a 1905
message to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt proposed that the
law should forbid contributions to political committees by corporations.
He "also called for public financing of federal candidates via their politi-
cal parties."' 3 President Roosevelt can be credited for doing much to
bring the problems of campaign finance to the forefront of political dis-
cussion. The Tillman Act of 1907 prohibited corporations and interstate
banks from contributing directly to federal campaigns.4 Disclosure of
campaign finances was first required in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1910. That legislation was revised in 1925, and, as revised, the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act served as the campaign finance law until the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act ("FECA") was passed in 1971. 5
Other legislation was also passed regulating campaign finance prior to
1971. For example, in 1943, the Smith-Connally Act prohibited unions
from contributing to federal candidates. Then in 1947, the Taft-Hartley
Act "made permanent the ban on contributions to federal candidates
from unions, corporations, and interstate banks, and extended the prohi-
bition to include primaries as well as general elections."'6 Finally, in 1971
the FECA was passed, repealing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Fur-
thermore, the Revenue Act of 1971 set up a public campaign fund for
2. Hoover Institution, Public Policy Inquiry: Campaign Finance History, at http://







eligible presidential candidates (voluntary $1 check-off on federal income
tax returns).7 It has been the law arising after Watergate and as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court that is currently at issue.
2. Watergate and the Need for Campaign Finance Legislation
The 1972 presidential election will long be considered a watershed year
in American presidential politics. It transformed the presidency, the law,
and the nation. Beyond the history and fascination with a man and cor-
ruption, Watergate forever changed the face of campaign finance law and
the way in which the American public perceives the financing of political
campaigns. It was in the shadow of Watergate that the 1974 amendments
to the FECA were passed. That set the ball rolling for a Supreme Court
review of campaign finance law in the case of Buckley v. Valeo. In turn,
Buckley has been the standard by which all challenges to campaign fi-
nance laws have been brought since 1976, although the standard has
morphed somewhat over the years.
Watergate was "by consensus, the impetus for passage of the 1974
amendments (to the FECA). '' 8 According to Eric L. Richards, "[I]n
seeking reelection as president in 1972, Richard Nixon and his fundrais-
ing organization, the Committee for the Reelection of the President
(CREEP), had raised well in excess of $50,000,000, often in illegal fashion
or in ways otherwise meant to bypass the 1971 FECA disclosure
requirements."9
During the investigations that followed discovery of the Watergate
break-in, it was discovered that the Milk Producers Association had
pledged $2 million to President Nixon's reelection campaign-a con-
tribution designed in part to secure an increase in milk support
prices. It also was alleged that American Airlines had contributed
funds in return for the government approval of more profitable
routes for the airline. Finally, accusations were made that, during
the Nixon administration, Justice Department officials settled anti-
trust charges against International Telephone & Telegraph in return
for the company's promise to finance the GOP's national convention
through a subsidiary corporation.10
The abuses of the system in the 1972 election resulted in the 1974 amend-
ments to the FECA, which, in addition to providing for contribution and
expenditure limitations for federal campaigns, also "provided [the] option
of full public financing for presidential general elections, matching funds
for presidential primaries, and public funds for presidential nominating
conventions."" From the 1974 amendments, particularly the limits on
7. Id.
8. Eric L. Richards, The Emergence of Covert Speech and Its Implications for First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 559, 563 (2001).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Hoover Institution, supra note 2.
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contributions and expenditures in federal campaigns, the challenge was
made to the FECA as amended.
B. BUCKLEY V. VALEO AND THE RESULTING
AMENDMENTS TO THE FECA
In Buckley v. Valeo,12 various candidates for federal office and many
organizations challenged the 1971 FECA and the 1974 amendments
claiming the legislation was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld
parts of the statutes while striking down others, creating the current sys-
tem we have today. At issue in Buckley were
the following provisions: (a) individual political contributions are
limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall
annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent ex-
penditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly identified
candidate" are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candi-
dates for various federal offices and spending for national conven-
tions by political parties are subject to prescribed limits; (b)
contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels must
be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of
Presidential campaign activities is established by Subtitle H of the
Internal Revenue Code; and (d) a Federal Election Commission is
established to administer and enforce the legislation. 13
The Court determined that the contribution limitations were constitu-
tional under the First Amendment, because the government had a com-
pelling interest in preventing the appearance of corruption. "Of almost
equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the
impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness
of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions.' 14 The Court struck down all expenditure limita-
tions as an impermissible restriction on a candidate's First Amendment
speech. The Court struck down the FEC, as constituted in the original
Act, as a violation of the Appointment Clause of the Constitution, but
Congress reworked the FEC in the subsequent 1976 amendments to com-
ply with the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court upheld the Act's dis-
closure provisions and the public financing provision.15 The framework
for review of campaign finance laws in the modern era was set by the
Buckley decision.
The FECA was amended in 1976 to comply with the Court's ruling in
Buckley. Congress enacted the last major amendments to the FECA in
1979, and they primarily dealt with in-kind contributions by volunteers
and state and local parties' ability to spend unlimited amounts in promo-
tion of a federal candidate.' 6 The Court has reviewed various campaign
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 27.
15. See generally 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. Hoover Institution, supra note 2.
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finance laws since 1976, and those decisions have further changed the
face of campaign finance jurisprudence. Martin H. Redish provides an
excellent summary of the current law:
Today, the regulatory framework is largely the product of a synthesis
of the 1971 Act, the 1974 legislation, and Supreme Court-dictated
constitutional restrictions. Under that crazy-quilt framework, indi-
viduals may not contribute in excess of $1000 (in aggregate) to any
candidate or her authorized political committees for each election.
For purposes of contributions, primary elections for a party's nomi-
nation are distinguished from the general election for the office.
Thus, an individual may contribute $1000 to each. A person may not
contribute more than $20,000 in any calendar year to the political
committees established and maintained by a national political party.
Moreover, an individual may not contribute more than $5000 to any
other political committee in any calendar year. No individual may
make campaign contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in any
calendar year. Any contribution made to a candidate in a year other
than the calendar year in which the election is held is considered to
have been made during the calendar year of the election. 7
Different provisions apply to political action committees, commonly re-
ferred to as PACs. Redish summarizes those rules as follows:
Political action committees (PACs) may not make contributions in
excess of $5000 to any candidate or to her authorized political com-
mittee. PACs may not contribute more than $15,000 to the national
political committees in any calendar year, and may not contribute
more than $5000 to any other PAC in any calendar year. These limi-
tations do not apply to transfers of money between national, state,
district, or local political committees of the same political party.18
Many reform proposals have been through Congress since the 1979
amendments to the FECA, but the current state of the law remained un-
changed until President George W. Bush signed the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 into law on March 27, 2002.
III. SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
There has been much litigation in this area since Buckley. 19 In recent
years, the Court seems to be contemplating the idea of overturning Buck-
ley; however, with no consensus on the Court as to what to replace Buck-
ley with, the Court has thus far been unwilling to do so. The subsequent
litigation is too numerous to cover each and every case; therefore this
comment examines only five of the more important decisions of the
Court. None of the decisions has overturned Buckley; however, many
17. Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance
Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 787 (2001).
18. Id.
19. On March 27, 2002, the day the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was signed into
law, the National Rifle Association and a group led by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the law. Scott Lindlaw, Bush Signs Campaign
Bill, NRA Sues, at http://story.news.yahoo.com (Mar. 27, 2002).
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have pulled back from the rigid Buckley framework and interpreted it in
a way to allow more campaign finance regulation.
A. FEC V. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC.2 0
FEC. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (the "MCFL" case) reiterated the
importance of keeping corporate money from a corporation's general
treasury fund out of federal elections, but it clarified to what type of cor-
poration the relevant provision of the FECA applied. In this case, the
FEC charged MCFL with violating the FECA by using corporate funds to
publish and distribute a pamphlet expressly advocating the election of
"pro-life" candidates and listing candidates for federal office and their
stance on abortion.2 1 The Court determined that
[T]he first question is whether appellee Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc. (MCFL), a nonprofit, nonstock corporation, by financing
certain activity with its treasury funds, has violated the restriction on
independent spending contained in § 441b [2 U.S.C. 441b]. That sec-
tion prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make an ex-
penditure "in connection with" any federal election, and requires
that any expenditure for such purpose be financed by voluntary con-
tributions to a separate segregated fund. If appellee has violated
§441b, the next question is whether application of that section to
MCFL's conduct is constitutional.22
The Court held that § 441b did apply to MCFL,2 3 but the Court deter-
mined that as applied the section was unconstitutional. The basic distinc-
tion here was that MCFL was not organized to be a money-making entity.
MCFL was organized for the purpose of taking a position on a political
issue and advocating that position.24 As applied to MCFL, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b was an infringement on the free speech rights of that organiza-
tion.25 That provision of the FECA, however, is constitutional on its face.
B. AUSTIN V. MICHIGAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE2 6
This case upheld a Michigan state law that prohibited corporations
from using general treasury funds for expenditures in connection with
state elections. The importance of this case comes from its recognition
that "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption" is a com-
pelling state interest, and, furthermore, the state has an interest in an-
other type of corruption: "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corpo-
rate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
20. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
21. Id. at 243.
22. Id. at 241.
23. Id. at 245.
24. Id. at 241-42.
25. Id. at 255, 263-64.
26. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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the corporation's political ideas."' 27 According to some scholars, this case
indicates a willingness by the Court to look at justifications for campaign
finance laws discarded by Buckley.28 According to Raskin and Bonifaz,
"[b]y expanding this definition of corruption, the Court may have opened
the door for a possible reconsideration of Buckley in the future. '29 They
continue to explain the importance of this step by saying "[t]his concern,
now recognized by the Court, implicitly, if not explicitly, invokes the con-
stitutional right to cast a meaningful vote and to run for office on an
equal basis, rights which form the bedrock of democratic governance and
which were largely ignored in the Buckley decision."' 30
C. COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE V. FEC3 1
This case was a boomerang and landed at the Supreme Court twice. It
is included because it is a precursor to the more important decision
handed down the second time the Court hears the case. Therefore, this
case will be called Colorado I. In Colorado I, the FEC charged the Colo-
rado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (the Colorado party)
with violating the Party Expenditure Provision of the FECA. The Colo-
rado Party bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's
potential candidate, before having selected its own candidate for Con-
gress. According to the FEC, the purchase of the ad caused the Colorado
Party to exceed its expenditure limit under the FECA, because it believed
the purchase of the ad constituted an "expenditure in connection with the
general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office."' 32 The Court
held that "the First Amendment prohibits the application of this provi-
sion [2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)] to the kind of expenditure at issue here-an
expenditure that the political party has made independently, without co-
ordination with any candidate. ' 33 Therefore, the Court reinforced the
Buckley determination that completely independent expenditures cannot
be restricted. It is important, however, that the Court made such an em-
phatic point of defining a completely independent expenditure and did
not hold the provision unconstitutional as applied to coordinated
expenditures.
27. Id. at 659-60.
28. Jamin B. Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Wealth Primary: Campaign Fundraising and




31. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
32. Id. at 612.
33. Id. at 608.
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D. NIXON V. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC34
The respondents challenged a Missouri state law limiting contributions
to candidates for state office. The Court determined that "the principal
issues in this case are whether Buckley v. Valeo is authority for state limits
on contributions to state political candidates and whether the federal lim-
its approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, define
the scope of permissible state limitations today. ' 35 The Court held that
Buckley is authority for state regulation, but the state regulations do not
have to be "pegged to Buckley's dollars. '36 "Yet, oddly, Shrink Missouri
may also perhaps be seen as the beginning of the end of the Buckley era
in campaign finance doctrine. '37
According to Richard Briffault, "Shrink Missouri challenges Buckley in
three ways."'38
First, even in reaffirming Buckley's holding that contributions can be
subject to dollar limitations, Shrink Missouri subtly departed from
Buckley's emphasis on the speech-like nature of campaign contribu-
tions. Shrink Missouri's easy validation of the Missouri contribution
caps seems in tension with Buckley's determination that contribu-
tions are a form of political speech. Indeed, in declining to impose a
more rigorous standard of review, Shrink Missouri may have actually
adopted a more liberal one. Second, although the Shrink Missouri
holding commanded a six-justice majority, the concurring and dis-
senting opinions revealed that, for the first time, a clear majority of
the justices now disagree with critical elements of the Buckley ap-
proach to campaign finance regulation. As a result, Buckley's cur-
rent role and continued survival seem to be more an artifact of a lack
of agreement within the Court on how to replace Buckley than a
reflection of continued support for Buckley's approach. Third, for
the first time, members of the Court acknowledged in their opinions
the inability of the campaign finance laws produced and shaped by
Buckley to effectively regulate campaign finance practices. 39
Furthermore, the varying opinions in this case indicate a Court unsatis-
fied with the Buckley framework. Six justices indicated disagreement
with Buckley, but there is no consensus as to how to change it. "If, as
suggested by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, the Court were to
begin to take into account 'the post-Buckley experience,' then surely
Buckley would have to be substantially modified, if not replaced, since
there can be little disagreement with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that
'Buckley has not worked'. '40
34. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
35. Id. at 381-82.
36. Id. at 382.
37. Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of






E. FEC v. COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE 41
After the Court remanded Colorado I for a determination of whether
the FECA provision regulating coordinated expenditures was unconstitu-
tional, the case again worked its way up to the Supreme Court. This sec-
ond case will be called Colorado II. At this hearing, the Court
determined that the FECA provision regulating coordinated expendi-
tures is constitutional. 42 Coordinated expenditures differ from indepen-
dent expenditures in that they are expenditures made "in cooperation,
consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candi-
date, his authorized political committees, or their agents. ' '43 The Court
held that such coordinated expenditures could be treated as contributions
under the FECA and be permissibly regulated within the constructs of
Buckley. 44
Colorado II allows coordinated expenditures to be treated as contribu-
tions and accordingly regulated; therein lies its importance. This was not
addressed in Buckley and therefore adds to the framework of Buckley.
This decision also creates a problem. The problem is where to draw the
line between coordination and independent expenditures. Cases can be
imagined where that line might be very blurry. For instance, does there
have to be express communication, or can implicit or indirect communi-
cation be considered coordination? These are questions that will have to
be answered by the Court in the future.
IV. LEGISLATION BEFORE THE 107TH CONGRESS: THE
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACTS OF 2001/2002
This section will discuss the campaign finance legislation known as the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Discussion of the Senate bill below
refers to the McCain-Feingold bill, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2001, as passed by the Senate in the spring of 2001. Following the
discussion of S.27 is a discussion of H.R. 2356 as proposed in the summer
of 2001.45 Finally, there is an explanation of H.R. 2356, the Shays-
Meehan substitute bill (with amendments), as passed by the House and
Senate in the spring of 2002. This version of the legislation, the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act of 2002, was signed into law on March 27,
2002.
41. 121 S. Ct. 2351, 531 U.S. 923 (2001) [hereinafter Colorado II].
42. See generally id.
43. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
44. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2371.
45. The author has retained this portion of the article, written before final passage of
the legislation, to provide the reader with a comparison of the legislation as originally
proposed and as passed.
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A. S. 27-THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT OF 2001
Officially the 107th Congress referred the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2001, more commonly known as the McCain-Feingold bill, S.
27 to the Committee on Rules and Administration on January 22, 2001.46
The measure hit the floor of the Senate on March 19, 2001; after two
weeks of debate, the Senate passed S. 27 by a vote of 59-41. 47 The Senate
was the barrier to passage of campaign finance reform legislation in the
past. The House version, the Shays-Meehan bill, had previously passed
the House, but the Senate version was voted against.48 Passage of S. 27,
therefore, put the House in the interesting position of knowing, if they
passed the Shays-Meehan bill, campaign finance reform legislation would
likely become law. For that reason, Representatives Chris Shays and
Martin Meehan wanted to introduce a bill as close to S. 27 as possible to
avoid losing the legislation in the conference committee. The analysis of
S. 27 and H.R. 2356 will therefore be very much the same.
Title I of S. 27 is entitled "Reduction of Special Interest Influence."
This provision is an effort to remove "soft money" (unregulated contribu-
tions to political parties or committees) from federal elections. The basis
of the provision "with respect to soft money [is] to prohibit: (1) a national
committee of a political party (including specified related entities) from
soliciting or receiving contributions or making expenditures not subject to
FECA. '49 In addition, Title I allows for states to maintain their own
campaign finance regulations, but if expenditures are being made for Fed-
eral election activities, they must be made from funds subject to the
FECA as amended by this legislation. 50 If a State committee does con-
tribute to federal election activities, however, this bill now restricts such
contributions to $10,000 per year.51 It is important to note that there was
much debate on the Hill as to whether that provision is merely another
loophole. No definition as to what constitutes a State committee exists
under this provision. For example, in a state such as Texas that has over
200 counties, if each county party committee is a "State committee"
under this provision, it is easy to see how much money could flow into the
system through this provision.
Title II of S. 27 covers non-candidate expenditures. Subtitle A, "Elec-
tioneering Communications," requires filing with the FEC for any "elec-
tioneering communications exceeding $10,000 in the aggregate during any
46. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
47. Common Cause, CauseNet Action Center: Final Passage of McCain-Feingold Cam-
paign Finance Reform Bill, at http://causenet.commoncause.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
48. Common Cause, Chronology of Campaign Finance Reform-1979-1998, at http://
www.commoncause.org/issue-agenda/chrono.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
49. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 15, available at http://thomas.loc.gov





calendar year."'52 More importantly, this provision treats any election-
eering communication that is made in coordination with a candidate or
party as a contribution to that candidate or party and an expenditure by
that candidate or party.53 This is very important, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling in June 2001, in the Colorado H case, that coordi-
nated expenditures can be treated as contributions without a violation of
the Constitution.54 Therefore, it can be argued this provision has already
been ruled constitutional by the Court.
Title II, Subtitle B, "Independent and Coordinated Expenditures,"
amends the FECA to clarify the term "independent expenditure." Under
S. 27, the FECA would be amended so that "independent expenditure"
means "an expenditure: (1) by a person expressly advocating the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (2) that is not a coordi-
nated activity with the candidate or the candidate's agent or a person who
has engaged in coordinated activity with such candidate or such candi-
date's agent."'55 The importance of this provision is its attempt to rede-
fine what has emerged as the "magic words" standard of Buckley. 56 The
implication of this provision is that any communication falling under the
provision must be paid for with money regulated under the FECA, as
amended (so-called "hard money"). In other words, the communication
would have to disclose who paid for the advertisement and be paid for
with "hard dollars." Under S. 27, "express advocacy" would no longer be
limited to only those communications containing the words found in foot-
note 52 of the Buckley opinion. Instead, the test for "express advocacy"
would be whether the communication clearly identified the candidate (as
intended by the bill's sponsors that could include the name of the candi-
date or a photo of the candidate) and expressly advocates the election or
defeat of that candidate (in whatever form that takes).
Footnote 52 of Buckley does not require the use of "magic words" to
require the use of "hard money" (money regulated under the FECA) for
electioneering communications. This article contends the Supreme Court
and lower courts have misapplied this footnote in the years since Buckley.
The provision of the FECA, to which footnote 52 referred, was a provi-
sion limiting expenditures for communications advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate to $1,000 annually. Since the
Court found that provision unconstitutional, the "magic words" test has
been used to determine when "hard money" must be used for an elec-
tioneering communication. Courts have used footnote 52 to require the
use of "hard money" only for "those communications containing express
words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'sup-
port,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id.
54. See generally Colorado I.
55. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 16, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
56. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
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'reject'. '57 First, it is important to note this is merely a footnote to the
opinion. More importantly, the use of the words "such as" indicate a list
of examples, not an exhaustive list of terms that must be used to require
the communication be paid for with "hard money." Electioneering com-
munications that are obviously meant to support or oppose an identified
candidate for federal office (and obviously not "issue advocacy") can
therefore be regulated and required to be paid for with regulated dollars
within the constitutional boundaries as set forth in the Buckley opinion.
However, outside that standard as applied by the courts, it seems strange
to argue that certain ads, obviously advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate, are not electioneering communications merely because they
do not contain "magic words."
Title III, "Miscellaneous," contains some very important provisions.
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has vilified one of the
most contentious provisions, known as the Torricelli Amendment. This
provision, Section 305,
amends the Communications Act of 1934 with regard to television
media rates, to provide that the charges made for the use of any tele-
vision broadcast station, or by a provider of cable or satellite televi-
sion service, to any person who is legally qualified candidate for any
public office in connection with the campaign of such candidate for
nomination for election, or election, to such office shall not exceed
the lowest charge of the station for the same amount of time for the
same period. 58
This provision is also known as the "lowest unit rate" provision.59 An-
other provision, that proved to be a contentious issue in the House de-
bate, is Section 308, which increases contribution limits. Basically, this
section increases individual contribution limits to candidates from $1,000
to $2,000. It also increases the aggregate, annual contribution limit to
$37,500 from $30,000. Most importantly, this section allows for the index-
ing of contribution limits for inflation. 60 Contribution limits have re-
mained the same since the FECA was passed in 1971, due to the fact the
FECA did not allow indexing for inflation. Finally, Section 312 of Title
III, "directs the Comptroller General to study and report to Congress on
the clean money clean elections laws of Arizona and Maine to provide in
whole or in part for the public financing of election campaigns."'61 This
article will discuss state reform efforts later, but this provision is an im-
portant indication that the Senate is willing to look at the possibility of
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 16-17, available at http://
thomas.loc.gov (last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
59. This provision will likely be the springboard, if held constitutional, for future re-
forms providing for free air-time for candidates. That is a battle the National Association
of Broadcasters is already gearing up for, and newscasters on CNN are already speaking
out against any such measure when discussing campaign finance on talk shows. However,
the airwaves are public, and the government has the constitutional right to regulate those
airwaves to promote free speech.




publicly financing Congressional elections. It may be a political move
only, but it identifies the possibility in a significant piece of federal
legislation.
Title IV is the most important and necessary provision of the Act. Sec-
tion 401 is the severability provision of S. 27. According to Section 401,
[I]f any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, or the
application of a provision or amendment to any person or circum-
stance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and
amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions
and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected
by the holding.62
The importance of this provision is evident from the many challenges that
will be brought against the Act. Candidates, political groups, non-profits,
and others are divided into two diametrically opposed groups: either sup-
porting the reform or opposing the reform. There will be, therefore,
many challenges from those opposing the legislation. The severability
amendment allows a provision of the Act to be held unconstitutional,
without destroying the entire Act. The provision deemed unconstitu-
tional could be extracted leaving the rest of the Act intact.
Title V of S. 27 contains additional disclosure provisions. 63 The main
purpose of these provisions is to make more information more readily
available to the public. This will be done primarily through use of the
Internet.
B. H.R. 2356-THE SHAYS-MEEHAN BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT OF 2001, As PROPOSED SUMMER, 2001
H.R. 2356 is substantially similar to S. 27 passed in the Senate. This
article will, however, highlight a few additions that H.R. 2356 makes to
the Senate version (S. 27). First, in Title I, H.R. 2356 adds a definition of
"Federal election activity." The definition states that "Federal election
activity" includes:
(1) voter registration activity in the last 120 days of a Federal Elec-
tion; (2) voter identification, get-out-the-vote, or generic campaign
activity conducted in connection with an election in which a Federal
candidate is on the ballot; (3) public communications that refer to a
clearly identified Federal candidate and promote, support, attack, or
oppose a candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether they
expressly advocate a vote for or against); or (4) services by a State,
district, or local political party employee who spends at least 25 per-
cent of paid time per month on activities in connection with a Fed-
eral election.64
62. Bipartisan Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. § 401 (2001).
63. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 18, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
64. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 3, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
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The primary importance of this definition is the departure it takes from
the "magic words" standard for express advocacy set forth in Buckley.65
Title II adds a definition of "electioneering communication" to the pro-
vision that requires disclosure of such communications by any entity
spending more than $10,000 annually per year for such communications.
According to Sec. 201 of H.R. 2356, "electioneering communication"
means
Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a
clearly identified Federal candidate, made within 60 days of a gen-
eral, special, or runoff election, or within 30 days of a primary or
preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party
that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office the candi-
date seeks, and in the case of a communication that refers to a candi-
date for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted
to the relevant electorate. 66
The bill's sponsors believe this definition is sufficiently narrowly tailored
to withstand constitutional scrutiny, but an alternative definition is pro-
vided should it be deemed "constitutionally insufficient. '67 Subtitle B of
Title II also defines "coordinated expenditure" consistently with the
Court's ruling in the Colorado II case.68
Title III includes a so-called "millionaire provision." This provision is
an effort to diminish the advantage of independently wealthy candidates
over challengers that do not have the benefit of large personal funds to
use for their campaign. This provision "limits repayment of a candidate's
personal loans incurred in connection with his or her campaign to
$250,000 from contributions made to the candidate or any authorized
committee of the candidate after the election. '69 Noticeably absent from
Title III of H.R. 2356 was an increase in limits on contributions to individ-
ual candidates, which is present in S. 27. This provision was much de-
bated. Essentially three options were available to the House of
Representatives: (1) increase individual contribution limits for both the
House and Senate; (2) allow for the increase in individual contribution
limits for Senate races but not for House races; or (3) require individual
contribution limits for both the House and the Senate to remain as they
are under the FECA.
Titles IV and V of H.R. 2356 contain no discernable differences from
the Senate version. Title IV is the severability provision (previously dis-
cussed in relation to S. 27).
H.R. 2356 was reported out of the Committee on House Administra-
tion on July 10, 2001.70 On July 12, 2001 the Rules Committee reported
65. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
66. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 4, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, 1, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
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the rule for consideration of H.R. 2356 to the whole House.71 The rule
for consideration was not the rule the sponsors of the legislation believed
they were going to get for consideration of the bill. As the rule was re-
ported to the floor, the rule was designed to kill the legislation and make
it almost impossible to pass. This was ugly political maneuvering by op-
ponents of the legislation at its worst. As a result, "Rule H. Res. 188
failed passage of [the] House."72 A rule for consideration of a piece of
legislation rarely fails passage. A discharge petition was begun that
would overrule the Rules Committee and bring the legislation to the floor
of the House. 73 Two hundred-eighteen signatures, or a simple majority
were needed to bring the legislation to the floor.74 The requisite 218 sig-
natures were obtained by January 24, 2002. At that point, the proponents
of campaign finance reform were able to force a House vote on the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act. The vote occurred on February 14, 2002,
and the legislation passed with 240 votes. 75 The rare use of this parlia-
mentary tactic to get consideration of a piece of legislation illustrates the
contentiousness of campaign finance reform.
C. H.R. 2356-THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002,
PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON FEBRUARY 14, 2002, PASSED BY
THE SENATE ON MARCH 20, 2002, SIGNED INTO
LAW ON MARCH 27, 2002
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 will take effect on No-
vember 6, 2002, the day after the mid-term elections. The changes in con-
tribution limits will take effect on January 1, 2003.76 The summary of the
legislation is as follows:
e NATIONAL PARTIES. Bans national parties from raising and
spending soft money.
* PROHIBITION ON SOFT MONEY SOLICITATION. Prohibits Federal
officeholders from soliciting or raising soft money for political par-
ties at Federal, state, and local levels, and from soliciting or raising
soft money in connection with Federal election.
* STATE PARTIES. Requires state parties and local party commit-
tees to spend hard money on activities that influence Federal elec-
tions. Allows state parties and local party committees to spend a mix
of soft money (limited to $10,000 per donor per year) and hard
money on non-broadcast voter registration and get-out-the-vote ac-
tivities that do not mention a federal candidate. State parties and
local party committees cannot transfer funds for these activities, and
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. For more information on the discharge petition, a parliamentary rule of Congress,
see http://www.commoncause.org/publications/july01/smfaq.htm.
74. See http://www.commoncause.org/publications/an02/011502.htm (last visited Jan.
19, 2002).
75. Victory in the House, available at http://www.commoncause.org/mccainfeingold/
(last visited June 16, 2002).




Federal officeholders and national parties may not solicit soft money
for these activities.
* REQUIRES SHAM "ISSUE ADS" TO BE TREATED AS CAMPAIGN
ADS. Prohibits the use of corporate and union treasury money for
broadcast communications that mention a Federal candidate within
60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary and are targeted
at the candidate's electorate. (Unions and corporations can finance
these ads through their PACs.) Requires individuals and groups of
individuals to disclose contributions and expenditures for similar
broadcast communications.
* INCREASES INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. Raises limits on
individual contributions to Senate and Presidential campaigns to
$2,000 and indexes for inflation.
* PROVIDES FOR CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES TO RECEIVE
THE LOWEST UNIT RATE FOR BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS WITHIN
45 DAYS OF A PRIMARY OR 60 DAYS BEFORE A GENERAL ELECTION.
Requires broadcast, cable or satellite providers to charge candidates
and national committees of political parties the lowest amount they
have charged any other advertiser during the preceding 180 days.
* SEVERABILITY PROVISION. If a provision of the bill is held un-
constitutional, the remainder of the bill is not affected. 77
Three amendments were also passed. An amendment offered by Rep-
resentative Wamp was passed increasing the limit on individual contribu-
tions to House candidates to $2,000 indexed for inflation.78 Another
amendment, introduced by Representative Capito, "allows a candidate
running against a wealthy opponent (who spends more than a threshold
amount of his or her own money) to raise hard money contributions at
triple the usual limit, and to receive additional coordinated party expend-
itures."' 79 Finally, an amendment offered by Congressmen Armey and
Ney "eliminates the transition rule that would allow leftover soft money
to be spent for a building." 80 Proponents of reform were concerned this
last amendment might push the legislation into conference committee,
but luckily it did not. The two chambers were successful in their goal to
avoid losing the legislation in conference committee, and the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act became law on March 27, 2002.
V. THE POLITICAL EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY
RATIONALES FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has viewed campaign finance law
through the lens of strict First Amendment scrutiny. Since Buckley, the
Court has held that limits on campaign expenditures are unconstitutional
77. Summary of the Shays-Meehan Substitute, available at http://www.commoncause.
org/mccainfeingold/ (last visited June 16, 2002).
78. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. § 307 (2002).
79. Shays-Meehan Campaign Finance Reform Votes on Amendments, List of Proposed
Amendments (Prepared by the offices of Congressmen Shays and Meehan, Feb. 13, 2002),




under the First Amendment, but they have also held that contribution
limits survive strict scrutiny due to the government's compelling interest
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.81 Unfortu-
nately, preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was the
only rationale the Court provided to the proponents of campaign finance
reform as a justification for passing any new measures to restrict the flow
of private money into the political process. This article argues, however,
that the Supreme Court is too narrow in its view of the First Amendment.
There are two other bases, consistent with the First Amendment, for up-
holding many campaign finance reform measures: the protection of the
democratic process and political equality.
This article further contends that, regardless of other rationales for up-
holding the legislation, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is
constitutional under traditional campaign finance First Amendment scru-
tiny. Therefore, this article turns first to an examination of the proposed
legislation under the Buckley framework.
A. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002:
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK
Many constitutional scholars have argued that the proposed legislation
is constitutional, even under the standard set out by Buckley. This article
agrees with those scholars. The provisions in the legislation are viewed as
a necessary first step to closing the loopholes that have opened in the
FECA.
While scholars have written prolifically on the constitutionality of Mc-
Cain-Feingold/Shays-Meehan, many have also testified to the Congres-
sional committees reviewing the legislation. The consensus appears to be
that there are two provisions of the legislation most likely to be attacked
on the battlefield of the First Amendment. Those two provisions are the
soft money ban and the restrictions on electioneering communications.
The soft money ban is constitutional under Buckley due to the Court's
recognition of a compelling governmental interest for contribution limits.
According to Senator Kerry, "banning soft money contributions does not
violate the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Buckley held that limits
on individual campaign contributions do not violate the First Amend-
ment. If a limit of $1000 on contributions by individuals was upheld as
constitutional, then a ban of contributions of $10,000, $100,000, or $1 mil-
lion is also going to be upheld. ' 82 Senator Kerry also noted the "risk of
corruption or the appearance of corruption" rationale in Buckley that
"warranted limits on individual campaign contributions. ' 83 The Senator
reasoned, "soft money contributions to political parties can be limited for
81. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
82. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001: Debate Before the Full Senate, 107th
Cong. (April 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last




the same reason."'8 4 The Senator was not the only supporter of the con-
stitutionality of McCain-Feingold during the Senate debate and commit-
tee hearings. Deborah Goldberg, the Deputy Director of the Democracy
Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, testi-
fied before the Committee on Rules and Administration that
[t]he Supreme Court's decisions in FEC v. National Right to Work
Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding a ban on the solicitation
of campaign contributions from the general public to corporate
PACs), and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (upholding a ban on the use of corporate money for indepen-
dent expenditures in state elections), offer clear constitutional sup-
port for the regulation of soft money from corporate and union
sources.
8 5
According to Donald J. Simon, general counsel for Common Cause, "the
abuses that the Court sees as inherent in a system of unlimited financial
contributions perfectly describes the soft money system."'8 6 Mr. Simon
professed, "the Court's repeated recognition that Congress can legislate
to address those abuses is a complete response to any claim that the soft
money provisions of McCain-Feingold are unconstitutional. ' 87 The soft
money problem has arisen from the inaction of the FEC, or their tolera-
tion, regarding certain abuses. The soft money ban does no more than
return to the state of the law intended in the FECA. The Court has never
held such a ban unconstitutional, and it should not do so under the Buck-
ley framework or any other framework.
The fight over the constitutionality of the electioneering communica-
tions provisions will be a tougher battle. The provisions are constitu-
tional, however, even under Buckley. The "magic words" test set up by
Buckley "has come to provide what is a wholly unworkable test that...
was never the intention of the Court."88
The Court chose to save FECA from invalidation by reading it very
narrowly. However, the Court did not say that Congress could never
devise alternate language that would be both sufficiently precise and
sufficiently narrow. The decision to narrowly construe a statute to
save it from potential vagueness and overbreadth problems do not
prevent further legislative refinements that eliminate those
problems. The key for Congress is to draw a line that distinguishes
between regulable electioneering and protected 'issue advocacy' in a
84. Id.
85. The Constitution and Campaign Finance: Hearing Before the Committee on Rules
and Administration, 107th Cong. (March 22, 2000) (statement of Deborah Goldberg),
available at http://ruies.senate.gov/hearings/2000/032200gold.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
86. Constitutional Perspective of Campaign Finance Reform: Hearing Before Commit-
tee on House Administration, 107th Cong. (June 14, 2001) (statement of Donald J. Simon),
available at http://www.house.gov/cha/business/transcripts-14).htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
87. Id.
88. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001: Debate Before the Full Senate, 107th
Cong. (Apr. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last vis-
ited Oct. 28, 2001).
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way that minimizes the vagueness and overbreadth concerns identi-
fied by the Court.89
The language in the legislation, defining regulable electioneering commu-
nications, is sufficiently narrow as to avoid any vagueness or overbreadth
problems present in the original FECA. It is a bright line test for express
advocacy that is easy to understand and will not regulate more than a
very minimal number of advertisements that are truly issue advocacy.
The Supreme Court has never held that to avoid overbreadth a statute
must avoid all restrictions on legitimate activity, only that it must be suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored.
Only two unique advertisements appeared in the 60-day period and
one advertisement in the 30-day period before the election (2000
election cycle). The big difference, however, is the relative propor-
tion of sham issue advocacy to total issue advocacy in the periods.
Whereas the two genuine issue advertisements in the 60-day period
before the 1998 elections made up 6.9% of the total number of
unique issue advertisements, the two advertisements in the 60-day
period before the 2000 period made up only 1.6% of the total num-
ber of unique advertisements. 90
Richard L. Hasen further believes that "the data show that genuine issue
advocacy featuring a candidate's name or likeness is relatively rare in the
period just before the election-when the public's focus is generally on
the election, not political issues generally." 91 He concludes, therefore,
that "with such narrow drafting, contribution limits applied through
bright-line tests are more defensible as necessary to prevent the dangers
of corruption and its appearance and therefore more likely to be upheld
as constitutional. '92 The test set out in H.R. 2356 is not a refutation of
the Buckley standard and does not violate the First Amendment, but it is
a constitutional evolution of a previously unworkable standard.
B. THE POLITICAL EQUALITY RATIONALE
Shunned in the courts since Buckley, the idea that campaign finance
reform can be justified as enhancing the political equality of candidates
and the general public is growing among proponents of reform and aca-
demic scholars. Political equality should be one of the foremost concerns
of the Supreme Court, and although past Courts have dismissed this idea,
the current Court should not. "The (Buckley) Court rejected the asserted
governmental interest in equalizing the ability of candidates to make
their views known, observing that 'the concept that the government may
89. The Constitution and Campaign Finance: Hearing Before the Committee on Rules
and Administration, 107th Cong. (Mar. 22, 2000) (statement of Deborah Goldberg), availa-
ble at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2000/032200gold.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001).
90. Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Deter-
mine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1796 (2001) (analysis of empirical evidence on electioneering commu-
nications in light of proposed legislation regulating such communications).
91. Id. at 1802-03.
92. Id. at 1803.
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restrict the spending of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voices of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment'. ' 93
However, some new arguments for limiting spending might convince the
Court. One such argument is that "at some level, spending money is no
longer a communications function but rather a reflection of economic
power that government may regulate. ' 94 It is possible that such an argu-
ment could support an equal protection claim under Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.
If only the very wealthy, or those that can raise inordinate sums of
money (usually well off themselves), can afford to run for office, then a
lack of equality in representation results. The majority of the population,
which is not wealthy, is inadequately represented in the federal
government.
Long-time civil rights activist Dr. Gwendolyn Patton observed that
the current electoral system is rigged for the benefit of wealthy can-
didates or those who can raise money from the wealthy, leaving us
without candidates who really represent the working class and espe-
cially the poor. Calling the task of getting private money out of pub-
lic elections 'the unfinished business of the Voting Rights
Movement,' she identified the Achilles heel of American elections -
the fundamental unfairness and inequality of the way we finance the
system. 95
The wealth primary, as Jamin B. Raskin and John Bonifaz have termed
it, overwhelmingly decides congressional elections. For example, "the
person who raises and spends the most money over the course of a cam-
paign is overwhelmingly (consistently over 80%) likely to become the
general election winner."' 96 The cost of running a campaign for Congress
is phenomenal and has reached the point where "people of ordinary
means can barely dream of holding congressional office."'97 While some
argue that the most popular candidate gets the most money, thereby le-
gitimizing the current campaign finance system, the number of contribu-
tions is not the determining factor in success. "The amount of money
available to spend is far more important than the number of contributions
collected."98 It is not true, therefore, that the amount of money equals
broad support from the voting and contributing public. Furthermore, a
large number of congressional candidates, and winners, are indepen-
dently wealthy and fund their own campaigns (obviously not revealing a
measure of wide public support).
At least 71 of 435 United States Representatives and twenty-six out
of 100 United States Senators are millionaires, compared to less than
93. Alan B. Morrison, Watch What You Wish For, 9-36 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(Jan. 1, 1998 - Feb. 1, 1998), at http://www.prospect.org/print/V9/36/morrison-a.html (citing
Buckley).
94. Id.






one-half of one percent of the American public. This means that
millionaires are over-represented in the House by a factor of more
than 3,000 percent and in the Senate by a factor of more than 5,000
percent. 99
Such staggering statistics, combined with the fact that "numerous wealth
primary winners who go on to capture congressional seats are relying pri-
marily on just one donor-themselves," 100 prove that equality is lacking
in representation.
Economic disparities also create a lack of equality in who can contrib-
ute to congressional campaigns. While the law cannot solve the economic
disparities that exist in society, it should prevent wealthy interests from
exercising more than their fair share of influence over elected officials.
"Out of a country of 250 million people, according to Roll Call newspa-
per, fewer than 900,000 gave direct individual contributions of $200 or
more in 1992. Yet these contributions, combined with PAC contributions,
constitute the vast bulk of the money raised."' 01 Thus, well under 1% of
the population, together with PACs, are providing the vast majority of
donations to federal campaigns. Under the natural assumption that cam-
paign contributors have more access to candidates and elected officials
than a non-contributor, that means less than 1% of the population has a
tremendous ability to influence elected officials, possibly and frequently
to the detriment of much of the rest of the population.
How does the wealth primary offend the Constitution? The tyranny
of private money in politics violates the principles of political equal-
ity and one-person-one-vote by making it exceedingly difficult for all
but the wealthy (and those backed by the wealthy) to run for office,
by leaving the non-affluent majority without meaningful electoral
choices, and by assuring that wealthy interests will set the parameters
of public debate and the content of the legislative agenda. 102
"One important goal of campaign finance law ought to be to reduce the
tension between the goal of equal voter influence over election outcomes
and the unequal influence of wealthy individuals and interest groups cur-
rently. '103 This goal is important, because "when extreme inequalities of
wealth bear directly on campaign financing and spending, as they cur-
rently do, the norm of voter equality is undermined.I10 4
As previously noted, inequalities also result from the unequal access
large contributors gain to candidates and elected officials. The savings
and loan scandals and the figure of Charles Keating is a prime example.
Charles Keating "raised over $1.3 million for five senators in an effort to
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Raskin & Bonifax, supra note 28.
102. Id.




thwart a federal investigation into his failing savings and loan." 10 5 It is
interesting to note that one of the five senators to whom Keating contrib-
uted was John McCain, now one of the leading proponents of campaign
finance reform. Keating "explained, 'One question ... had to do with
whether my financial support in any way influenced several political
figures to take up my cause. I want to say in the most forceful way I can:
I certainly hope so.' And it did, jacking up the cost of a bailout that will
ultimately exceed $300 billion. 106 As Rosenkranz wrote his article, he
compiled statements of current and former members of Congress regard-
ing campaign finance. Those statements are very illustrative of the prob-
lem, and they demonstrate the inequalities that result from the current
campaign finance system.
Money buys access. Senator Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) admit-
ted, 'We end up spending time with people only because they can
give money to us.' Former Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-
Kentucky) put it this way: 'People who contribute get the ear of the
member and the ear of the staff. They have the access.' Former Ma-
jority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine) echoed this sentiment: 'I
think it gives them the opportunity to gain access and present their
views in a way that might otherwise not be the case.' Money buys
results. As former Representative Vin Weber (R-Minnesota) stated,
'If nobody cares about it very much, the special interest will get its
way .... And all of us, me included, are guilty of this: If the company
or interest group is (a) supportive of you, and (b) vitally concerned
about an issue that (c) nobody else in your district knows about or
ever will know about, then the political calculus is very simple.' For-
mer Representative Mel Levine (D-California) offered this observa-
tion: 'On the tax side, the appropriations side, the subsidy side, and
the expenditure side, decisions are clearly weighted and influ-
enced ... by who has contributed to the candidates.' The need to
chase after money influences votes. Former Representative Tim
Penny (D-Minnesota) has observed, 'Candidates know . . . they're
going to risk losing that money if certain groups are displeased with
them .... I can tell you on the house floor .... the consideration
of... whether the groups will withhold campaign funds is a consider-
ation that does come into play.' The need to chase after money in-
fluences official conduct other than voting. Former Representative
Dennis Eckart (D-Ohio) put it this way: 'There's a lot of stuff in
there we don't know about. So... yes, a few folks can toss in some
things, particularly in Appropriations and Ways and Means.' Former
Representative Hamilton Fish (R-New York) made a similar point:
'Certainly (amendments are) influenced by campaign financing. You
offer amendments that are brought to you by special interests.'
Campaign contributions can buy inaction. 'It's often not what you
do, but what you don't do,' said former Representative Peter
105. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in "Faulty Assumptions": A Response





Kostmayer (D-Pennsylvania). On some issues, 'maybe you just keep
quiet .... That way you don't alienate anybody."10 7
One way for the Court to recognize the equality rationale for campaign
finance reform and uphold new restrictions on campaign finance is to de-
part from the false idea that money is speech. If political money is
viewed as property, exclusively or merely in addition to its speech quali-
ties, the Court can regulate it using a standard somewhere in between
speech and property.'0 8 As Spencer Overton suggests, when Justice John
Paul Stevens wrote "[m]oney is property; it is not speech,"' 0 9 that "simple
point, which attacks the theoretical underpinnings of the leading cam-
paign finance case, Buckley v. Valeo, is more than a meaningless semantic
ploy."110 The Court in Buckley never actually stated that money is
speech, but opponents of campaign finance reform have been singing that
tune since the case was decided. Overton "proposes that the Due Process
and Takings Clauses (together the "Property Clauses") of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are at least as (if not more) applicable to politi-
cal money as the First Amendment."11' He continues to say that by ex-
amining political money under the Property Clauses the authority of
"Congress and state and local legislatures over political money" would be
enhanced. 112
Thinking of political money as property-like in some respects could
allow for a legal system that maintains due respect for both the liber-
ties of those with political money and other weighty societal inter-
ests, such as widespread participation and limiting the political
influence of wealth. This approach resolves the inadequacies
(whether through constitutional libertarian or egalitarian perspec-
tives) of heavy-handed judicial constraints on the regulation of politi-
cal money by moving the debate to the more suitable political arena.
Rather than supporting or condemning any particular strategy of re-
form, judicial treatment that appreciates the property characteristics
of political money would provide greater respect for democratic de-
bate and decisions with regard to political money." 3
If the current Court chooses to consider the property characteristics of
money, it could decide, within constitutional bounds, that many reforms
being sought are constitutional. The property characteristics of money
also support a political equality view of campaign finance legislation.
107. Id. at 875-77.
108. See generally, Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Char-
acteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235 (2000).
109. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Overton, supra note 108, at 1236.
111. Id. at 1239.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1240.
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C. PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY REQUIRE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
The First Amendment guarantees the right to free speech not only
for those who have money, but for all the people. And there cannot
be a more important place to ensure that right to free speech is pro-
tected than in the democratic process. For the essence of our democ-
racy is that the people are the ultimate rulers. This means all the
people. And, it requires that all the people have the right to speak
freely in the process of electing our representatives-our servants-
in government.' 1 4
The foundation of our democracy and representative form of government
is the idea that the people should choose their representatives to govern
them. The founding fathers struggled with creating a form of government
that gave power to the people but still had the ability to effectively gov-
ern a nation. Most importantly, the founding fathers rejected a monarchy
form of government based on an aristocracy. While, our early leaders
were without question aristocratic (at least from the standards of a new
and fledgling nation), the ideal was that leadership should be based on
ability. The United States is now the most powerful nation in the world,
and, while ability crosses all economic classes, it is primarily the wealthy
that continue to govern. It is also the wealthy that have the resources to
influence those that govern. Democracy is harmed as a result. The voice
of the people is not being heard; instead, the voice of money prevails.
Campaign finance reform is desperately needed to allow the voice of the
people to prevail.
The power of money also harms democracy by influencing who chooses
to enter public service. According to Robert Kuttner, "you cannot have
true representative government without free expression, and you cannot
have it if money trumps votes."1 5 Kuttner asserts, "the money hurdle, by
definition, deters the impecunious from entering electoral politics. It is
depressing to spend half your time raising money. A lot of talented
populists who might champion ordinary citizens and rouse the electorate
from its torpor never get into the race."'1 16 So perhaps it is the influence
of money in politics that is actually suppressing the free speech rights of
those who desire to enter the fray but don't because of the rigors of fun-
draising and the dangers of being beholden to contributors.
Fair and vigorous competition among candidates and parties is criti-
cal for the legitimacy of our elections and of the government those
elections produce. Campaign finance law, in turn, can have a direct
effect on the competitiveness of elections. In constructing a new
campaign finance doctrine-or in revamping current doctrine-the
Court should give greater weight to the effect of campaign finance
114. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 28.
115. Robert Kuttner, Rescuing Democracy from "Speech", 9-36 THE AMERICAN PROS-




rules on electoral competition.' 1 7
Competitive elections are central to democracy, and the statistics prove
that elections are no longer competitive. When the candidate that either
has the ability to finance his or her own campaign or the candidate that
has the most money to spend wins well over the majority of the time, the
competitiveness of elections is in serious doubt.118
Another concern is that the Court is supplanting the duties of the legis-
lature by deciding issues in an area which the legislature has more exper-
tise. Some justices on the Court have, however, indicated a willingness to
return many campaign finance issues to the experience of Congress.
More generally, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg indicated (in Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov'n PAC) that given that 'constitutionally protected
interests lie on both sides of the legal equation,' and given the legis-
lature's 'significantly greater institutional expertise ... in the field of
election regulation,' they would be willing to give greater deference
'to empirical legislative judgments' as well as to the legislature's 'po-
litical judgment' including the constitutionally controversial judg-
ment-rejected by Buckley-that 'unlimited spending threatens the
integrity of the electoral process'. 119
The Court has frequently refused to hear cases that they felt constituted a
political judgment, and an argument can be made that campaign finance
regulations are better left to the "political branch" of government, Con-
gress. The First Amendment would obviously still apply, but the Court
should be willing to consider other rationales (than just the appearance of
corruption) as compelling government interests.
Voter apathy is another harm to democracy that results from too much
money in the political process. Some people do not vote simply because
they choose not to participate in the political process. Others do not
vote, because, for whatever reason, they are unable to reach the polling
place. Many, however, choose not to vote, because they feel the election
is a predetermined outcome decided by those with money and influence.
It is no wonder that voting rates decline precipitously with income
level, or that hugely disproportionate numbers of the poor regard
electoral results as a fait accompli and then vote with their feet by
never leaving home. Indeed, 'apathy' looks like a much more ra-
tional choice when participation means getting to cast a ballot for
one of two candidates pre-selected by wealthy groups and individu-
als, many of whom do not even inhabit the district or state in which
the election is taking place. 120
As a result of voter apathy, "legislative initiatives arose from concern that
existing finance laws jeopardize 'the democratic principle of 'one person,
one vote' by allowing large contributors to have a disproportionate and
therefore deleterious influence on the political process, and diminish[]
117. Briffault, supra note 37, at 1731-32.
118. See generally Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 28.
119. Briffault, supra note 37, at 1755.
120. See generally, Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 28.
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the rights of citizens of all backgrounds to equal and meaningful partici-
pation in the democratic process'." 121 The influence of money on politics
must, therefore, be diminished to preserve the electoral process essential
to democracy.
The democracy rationale for campaign finance reform does not have to
be considered as separate from the First Amendment. Burt Neuborne
puts forth a democracy-centered reading of the First Amendment that
would allow the Court to prioritize the importance of both democratic
processes and speech.
James Madison's First Amendment is self-consciously structured and
organized as the life-cycle of a democratic idea-an idea that begins
in the recesses of individual belief, is communicated to others
through speech and press, provokes collective action through assem-
bly and association, and finally matures into public policy through
formal interaction with the political branches. It is no coincidence
that the textual rhythm of the First Amendment moves from protec-
tion of internal conscience in the religion clauses, to protection of
individual expression in the speech clause, to broad community-wide
discussion in the press clause, to concerted action in the assembly
(and implied association) clause, and, finally, to formal political ac-
tivity in the petition clause. Indeed, no rights-bearing document in
the Western tradition approximates the precise organizational clarity
of the First Amendment as a road map of democracy. 122
This reading of the First Amendment allows the Court to view speech in
light of democracy.
The deep structure of the First Amendment is the first complete,
substantive blueprint of democracy; it tells us that you cannot suc-
ceed in getting to the end point of democratic politics unless you
respect its beginnings in the core of the human spirit. But that deep
structure also provides us with a tie-breaking principle that helps us
to decide whose autonomy to privilege in a democracy case. Read as
a bulwark of democracy (as well as a protection of individual auton-
omy), the First Amendment tells us that, when more than one candi-
date for First Amendment autonomy protection exists in a
democracy case, the Court should privilege behavior that benefits
democracy rather than behavior that saps its vitality. 123
In conclusion, the First Amendment can support a political equality ratio-
nale and a democracy rationale for campaign finance reform. Congress
simply must write a law that is not vague or overbroad and remains con-
tent-neutral. Then, the Court may decide that, in light of current times
and ever more prolific spending in campaigns, those rationales are com-
pelling governmental interests in First Amendment jurisprudence. In
121. Rep. Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizon for Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 307, 314 (2000).
122. Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment,
93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1069 (1999).
123. Id. at 1070.
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fact, that is exactly what the Court should hold in the first case, arising
out of the legislation, to reach the Court.
VI. THE CASE FOR PUBLIC FINANCING OF
FEDERAL ELECTIONS
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is constitutional and a
necessary first step in returning the electoral process to the people, all the
people. Ultimately, however, this piece of legislation will not go far
enough. It will still allow some loopholes to remain, and politics will still
be too expensive a proposition for most of those interested. A system of
full, voluntary public financing of Federal candidates should, therefore,
be the ultimate goal of any system of reform.
Most public financing programs are termed "Clean Money" or "Clean
Election" options. A typical program involves a candidate voluntarily ac-
cepting spending limits to receive public dollars to finance his or her cam-
paign. In order to be eligible for the program, most options require the
candidate to raise a certain amount of "seed" money in a specified num-
ber of small contributions. This requirement helps insure that public
money is going to viable candidates. Also, most programs allow for fur-
ther infusions of campaign money from the state, if the candidate is faced
with an opponent not in the system that spends over a certain threshold.
Such programs are widely considered to be constitutional, as they are vol-
untary. Some have argued that the programs are a form of coercion and,
therefore, not constitutional. Since the Court upheld the voluntary public
financing of Presidential elections in Buckley, 124 however, it seems un-
likely the Court will hold an otherwise constitutional program unconstitu-
tional on the coercion argument.
Several states have been experimenting with various public-financing
programs. In 1996, voters in Maine endorsed a program of full public
financing for candidates for state office.' 2 5 Since then several other states
have begun attempting to put in place similar programs, including: Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, Arizona, Missouri, and Idaho.126
Under the Maine plan, approved by referendum last year, candidates
who agree to voluntary limits get public funding. If an opposing can-
didate refuses to accept the limit, or if interest groups become his de
facto contributors, then the other candidate receives compensatory
public funds. A federal version of this approach has been sponsored
by Senators Kerry, Glenn, Wellstone, Biden, and Leahy.12 7
Rep. Harold E. Ford, Jr. is one supporter of "clean elections" programs
and states "the most comprehensive campaign finance reform efforts on
the federal level ought to include the public financing of congressional
124. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).





elections." 128 According to Rep. Ford,
The Maine Clean Election Act, a ballot initiative that was approved
by a margin of more than ten percentage points and will affect the
2000 election season, is one of the more ambitious examples. The
law, which has been challenged in federal court, offers full public
financing to candidates who limit themselves to soliciting two sorts of
funds-$5 "qualifying contributions" from individuals in a candi-
date's district, and $100-maximum "seed contributions," which may
only be used to finance a candidate's efforts to obtain qualifying con-
tributions. Once a candidate obtains a certain number of qualifying
contributions, he may seek 'Clean Election Act' status and become
eligible for public campaign financing and must accept no further
private contributions.1 29
The First Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the program. 130 Ver-
mont and Massachusetts have recently passed public financing programs
as well in forms similar to that of Maine. The Vermont program will
likely be struck down though, as it imposes spending limits on all candi-
dates, whether they accept public financing. 131
Public financing of Federal elections should be a goal of any reform
proposal. McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan address this issue through
their provision for a study of the Maine program and other state systems.
Public financing permits candidates to focus their own and voters'
attention on platforms and leadership rather than on money. As
First Amendment scholar Cass Sunstein pointed out more than a
decade ago, 'what seems to be government regulation of speech actu-
ally might promote free speech, and should not be treated as an
abridgment at all.' Moreover, public financing can level the playing
field for candidates and encourage new and talented people to par-
ticipate more fully in our democracy.1 32
While, many contend the government cannot afford public financing of
elections, or the taxpayers should not have to pay for public financing,
such a program could actually save money. 33 The most compelling rea-
sons, however, for a system of public financing of Federal elections are to
promote equality among the electorate and to promote the best and most
capable candidates, rather than just the most wealthy.
128. Ford & Levien, supra note 121, at 317.
129. Id. at 314-15.
130. Theodore Lazarus, The Main Clean Election Act: Cleansing Public Institutions of
Private Money, 34 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 79, 98 (2000).
131. For descriptions of the Massachusetts and Vermont programs, see generally Rep.
Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizon for Campaign Finance Reform, 37
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U.S. Senator Mark Hanna was quoted in 1895 as saying, "[t]here are
two things that are important in politics. The first is money and I can't
remember what the second one is.' '134 The problem is not new, but age
does not make a wrong right. While the population grows, so do the eco-
nomic disparities. On the other hand, voter turnout is declining. The
public scorns all things political, and it is not a far leap to assume one
reason is the perception of corruption. "Mark Twain once remarked, 'I
think I can say, and say with pride, that we have legislatures that bring
higher prices than any in the world'. ' 135 The problem has only become
worse since the days of Mark Twain. Campaigns cost more and more
every election cycle, the perception of corruption becomes worse every
year, and with the recent scandals of the Clinton administration and the
questions surrounding Enron in the Bush administration, something must
be done to return the electoral process to the people. The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is one step to remedying the problem of
private money in the public process. It is however only the first step. "In
the words of Thomas Paine, the famed agitator for the American Revolu-
tion and author of Common Sense: 'A long habit of not thinking a thing
wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a
formidable cry in defence of custom'. '136
In conclusion, the current system of financing campaigns for elected
office is perpetuating an apathetic public and a system of corruption, per-
ceived or real. The framework of Buckley v. Valeo has become, perhaps
always was, unworkable. Buckley should be overturned in light of the
compelling governmental interest in political equality and the promotion
of democracy. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 should be
upheld as constitutional in all respects. Beyond that, however, Congress
should seek to write legislation providing for the full, voluntary public
financing of all Federal candidates, after examining the State efforts.
Short of full public financing, any future legislation should also include a
provision prohibiting contributions from any individual or entity outside
the candidate's district or state, in the case of candidates for the House
and Senate respectively. Campaign finance reform is not anathema to
principles of free speech. Quite the contrary, campaign finance reform
(in the form of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 or similar
measures and public financing) will increase the free speech rights of all
citizens.
VIII. AFTERWORD
The last major obstacle to meaningful implementation of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act is the Federal Election Commission. The FEC
134. Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics, at http://www.





has only succeeded in opening loopholes in the law since its inception in
the FECA, not quite thirty years ago. Many believe the FEC must be
completely overhauled, or eliminated and replaced with a new body, for
any effective enforcement of campaign finance law to take place. This is
a justifiable position given the agency's record.
The FEC must make rules implementing the legislation's provisions.
"The four sponsors, and other advocates of a ban on soft money, say they
fear that the commission will effectively eviscerate the new restrictions by
permitting big donors to the national political parties to reroute their gifts
through the state parties."'1 37 The FEC did vote on a rule that will in-
clude the precise language of the legislation regarding phony "issue" ads
thereby maintaining the integrity of the legislation.' 38 However, support-
ers of the legislation are still concerned the FEC will issue rules that will
weaken the ban on soft money to be used in federal elections.' 39 Con-
gress must approve the rules after they are promulgated by the FEC.
Congress is likely, however, to approve whatever rules the FEC presents
to it. This article encourages the FEC to issue rules that effectively im-
plement and support the language and intent of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act.
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